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CHAPTER I 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
Depression is currently one of the three leading diagnoses of peo-
ple seeking treatment in mental health facilities. Estimates indicate 
that from 5 to 15% of the population has experienced a depression of a 
pathological or clinical nature (Mendels, 1970; Secunda, 1973). At pre-
sent 4 to 8 million Americans may be in need of pr1ofessional care for 
depression (Williams, Friedman, & Secunda, 1970). In addition, most 
people have experienced or will experience at least a mild depressive 
episode sometime during their lives. Despite the frequency of this dis-
order and the enormous public health problem it poses, relatively little 
research has been directed at its psychological aspects. In contrast, 
there is a plethora of theoretical formulation and biological research 
associated with depression (Beck, 1967; Brown, 1976). 
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM II, 1968), 
depression can be differentiated into one of four types: depressive 
neurosis, involutional meloncholia, manic-depressive psychosis (depressed 
type), or psychotic depressive reaction. This differentiation is based 
on factors such as the severity and the duration of the depression, the 
response to pharmacological agents, and the presence or absence of pre-
cipitating events prior to the depressive episode. Despite this varia-
bility in classification, depression is generally characterized by 
1 
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feelings of guilt, sadness, hopelessness, and loneliness. Accompanying 
these affective states are cognitive, behavioral, and physiological 
changes (Beck, 1967; Friedman & Katz, 1974; Grinker, Miller, Sabshin, 
Nann & Nunnally, 1961; Izard, 1972; Mendels, 1970). Much of the earlier 
psychological literature depicts de~ression as primarily an affective 
state or mood disorder which produces changes in behavior and thought. 
, 
ijore recently, however, this approach has been questioned and other 
models have been developed. These recent models emphasize the cognitive 
or behavioral aspects of depression. Instead of considering depression 
as primarily an affective disorder these newer models emphasize the view 
of depression as a cognitive or a behavioral disorder which produces the 
affective disturbances accompanying depression. At the present time it 
' 
is difficult to decide which of these' approaches fs most accurate since 
the overall relationship between affect, cognition, and behavior is un-
clear (Izard, 1972; Lazarus & Averill, 1970). Despite the fact that the 
psychological models of depression emphasize different processes, fre-
quently they overlap in their explanation of this phenomenon. 
The Psychoanalytic Theories 
One of the first attempts at a psychological explanation of depres-
sion came from Karl Abraham (1911). He viewed depression as originating 
from trauma experienced in the oral stage of development. These early 
developmental difficulties were followed later in life by loss. The 
loss could be real or imagined. It could involve the loss of someone 
close through death or separation or it could involve a loss of self-
esteem, or a value system. The result of the loss is a feeling of aggres-
sion and anger towards the lost object. However, rather than directing 
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the aggression at the object the individual turns the aggression inward 
as a result of identification with the lost object. This identification 
not only results in turning the anger inwards, but also results in the 
individual incorporating the deficiencies and weaknesses of the object. 
This theme of loss associated with depression presented by .Abraham is 
found in many of the later psychological theories. 
Freud (1917) did little to alter Abraham's theory of depression. 
He believed, however, that the loss involved in depression is at an un-
conscious level. The loss or rejection that the person experiences 
prior to a depression is actually not the loss that produces the depres-
sion. Rather, this loss is symbolic of an earlier loss experienced in 
the individual's early development. Freud also emphasized the.importance 
of guilt experienced by the individual because of 1feelings of hostility. 
Also like .Abraham, Freud believed that eventually the hostility is 
turned inwards and produces the depression •. 
Fenichel (1945) emphasized the dependent character of the depres-
sion-prone individual. This. dependency is supposedly a result of fixa-
tion· at the oral stage. Fenichel further characterized the depressed 
person as similar to a child who relies on external supplies as a basis 
for self-esteem. When the external supplies are removed the person's 
self-esteem is lowered. The person then attempts to force others to re-
plenish these supplies through his or her depressive behaviors. 
Klein (1948) stressed the developmental aspects associated with de-
pression. In particular she emphasized the importance of the first year 
of life. She proposed that during the first year the child experiences 
ambivalent feelings towards the mother because the mother is unable to 
satisfy the child's insatiable demands. The resulting ambivalent feel-
4 
ings take the form of alternating love and hate directed towards the 
mother. As a result of these feelings the child experiences a sense of 
fear and guilt. If the ambivalent feelings are strong enough the child 
continues to experience fear and guilt resulting in what Klein called a 
"depressive position". 
Bibring (1953) stressed the role of self-esteem in influencing de-
pression. He felt that self-esteem originates from a person's ability 
to achieve aspirations. The depressed person is one who is unable to 
meet self-expectations. This inability results in feelings of helpless-
ness, powerlessness, and unworthiness. In contrast to the earlier theo-
rists Bibring believed that a predisposition toward depression did not 
occur exclusively during the oral stage of development. He believed 
that a susceptibili_ty to become depressed could be the result of expe-
riences of frustration and helplessness at any stage of development. 
Most of the psychoanalytic theories concerning depression have been 
based on clinical observations. The research supporting many of the 
psychoanalytic concepts and the dynamics of depression is sparse 
(Grinker et al., 1961; Mendelson, 1960). However, the bulk of the re~ 
search investigates the relationship between depression and loss, and 
the relationship between hostility and depression. The notion that de-
pression is brought about by a loss was given support in a study by 
Spitz (1946) who observed that children six months to five years of age 
developed a condition that he termed "anaclitic depression" when they 
were separated from their mothers for over five months. The infants ap-
peared to be apathetic and·weepy, reduced the amount they ate, slept ir-
reguiarly, and in some instances died. If the children were reunited 
with their mothers their condition improved; however, they occasionally 
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had periods in which they regressed to their earlier depressed condition. 
Brown (1961) found that 41% of 216 hospitalized depressives had lost 
one parent before the age of fifteen. This finding was significant when 
compared with the overall rate of orphanhood in England, 12%, and a 
group of medical patients, out of which 19.6% had lost one parent before 
the age of 15. 
Schmale (1958) noted the high rate of depressive symptoms prior to 
physical illnesses in medical patients. He also noted that the patients 
reported some form of loss or separation prior to the depressive symp-
toms. 
Beck, Sethi, and Tuthill (1963) found that the incidence of parent-
al loss was higher for a high depressed group, 27%, than it was for a 
non-depressed group, 12%. From this ~inding Beck:et al. concluded that 
the loss of a parent is an important factor in the later development of 
a severe depression. 
Kaufman and Rosenblum (1967) observed a condition in infant monkeys 
that was similar to depression. This condition was brought about by 
separating the infant monkeys from their mothers. Their initial reac-
tion to separation was that of listlessness followed later by a "con-
servation-withdrawal, and postural collapse". 
Despite the apparent support for the relationship between parental 
loss and depression, it should be noted that many of these studies have 
been criticized since the higher rate of parental loss is not specific 
to depression and has been associated with other conditions (Gregory, 
1961). 
In an attempt to clarify the relationship between hostility and de-
pression, Gershon, Cromer, and Klerman (1968) studied six depressed 
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females. The subjects were given the Hamilton Depressed Symptom Scale 
(1960) and rated on three minutes of free associations for hostility us-
ing a technique by Gottschalk, Gleser, and Springer (1963). A slight 
negative relationship, .E. = -.11, was found between level of depression 
and hostility-out. A positive correlation was found for the level of de-
pression and hostility-in, .!:. = .45. Gottschalk, Gleser, and Springer 
(1963) found a positive correlation, .E. = .47, between the level of depres-
sion as measured by the Beck Depression Inventory and scores on a hostil-
ity-in scale. There was a negative correlation between the level of de-
pression and a hostility-out scale, r = -.31. 
Several factor analytic studies (Beck, 1967; Cattell & Bjerstedt, 
1966; Grinker et al., 1961; Izard, 1972) have demonstrated that the fac-
tor of hostility or aggression is present in depression. More specifi-
cally, Izard (1972) demonstrated the presence of both inner directed and 
outer directed hostility in depression. 
Forrest and Hokanson (1975) have experimentally demonstrated the 
presence of inner directed hostility associated with depression. They 
had depressed and non-depressed subjects receive shock from a confederate 
in a dyadic situation. Following the shock the subjects could recipro-
cate with a shock or reward to the confederate, or administer self-shock 
of high or low intensity. It was found that overall depressed subjects 
administered a higher frequency of self-shock. In addition, it was found 
that the depressed group administered more self-shock when the shock was. 
of high intensity than when the shock was of low intensity. In contrast, 
non-depressed subjects administered more self-shock in the low intensity 
condition than in the high intensity condition. 
In summary, the psychoanalytic theories have emphasized and demon-
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stated the existence of a relationship between depression and loss, and 
depression and hostility. However, it should be noted that the character-
istics of loss and hostility have not been shown to be specific to depres-
sion. 
The Behavioral Theories 
The con€ept of reinforcement is centnal to the behavioral theories. 
It has been repeatedly demonstrated that reinforcement influences behav-
ior (Ferster, 1958; Rotter, 1954; Skinner, 1953), accordingly, the con-
cept of depre~sion is explained in terms of behavior regulated by rein-
forcement. 
Bandura (1969) characterized the d~pressed person as one who denies 
him-or herself positive self-reinforcement by setting excessively high 
·standards for reinforcement. Bandura also stated that the depressed per-
son compares him-or herself with models who are noted for their extraor-
dinary achievements. By making these comparisons the individual produces 
aversive stimuli which maintain the depressed condition. 
Ferster (1966) and Lazarus (1968) emphasized the scheduling of 
reinforcement as the important factor in producing and maintaining the 
depressive behaviors. They maintained that the depressed person is on an 
extinction schedule or at least on a schedule which requires large amounts 
of responding to produce a change in the environment. This lack of rein-
forcement leads to a reduction in the frequency of reinforcible behaviors. 
They also propose that depression can be produced by aversive stimuli 
which lead to aversively motivated behaviors or anxiety-reducing behav-
iors which interfere with reinforcible behaviors. Burgess (1968) expand-
ed this idea and suggested that depressive behaviors are maintained by 
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their reinforcing consequences. Thus, behaviors such as negative verbali-
zations, sad facial affect, and somatic complaints are maintained by 
social reinforcements in the form of sympathy, interest, and concern. 
Costello (1972) has taken a different approach and proposed that a 
general loss of reinforcer effectiveness is the primary characteristic 
of depression. This loss of reinforcer effectiveness is the result of 
biochemical changes and/or a disruption in a behavioral chain. Costello 
maintains that a disruption in a behavioral chain can be brought about by 
the loss of a single reinforcer or the loss of a discriminative stimulus 
in that chain. The exact mechanism between the disruption of a chain of 
behavior and a generalized loss of reinforcer effectiveness has not been 
specified nor has it been demonstrated experimentally. 
Lewinsohn, Golding, Johannson, and Stewart (1968); Lewinsohn, 
Weinstein, and Shaw (1968); Libet and Lewinsohn (1973); Rosenberry, Weiss, 
and Lewinsohn (1969); arid Shaffer and Lewinsohn (1971) have emphasized 
the depressed person's lack of social skills as an important factor in 
depression. Rosenberry et al. (cited in Friedman & Katz, 1974) demon-
strated that the depressed persons's timing of social comments is less 
predictable and less homogeneous than those of a non-depressed control 
group. Libet and Lewinsohn (1973) also reported that the depressed in-
dividual interacts with only a few selected members of a group. They 
also reported that depressed individuals emit fewer positive reactions 
than non-depressed individuals. In addition, they observed that de-
pressed persons had a longer action latency in comparison to non-depressed 
persons •. Action latency was defined as the time it took a subject to 
respond to another subject's statements. Because of these deficits in 
social skills the depressed individual receives less reinforcement, 
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thereby maintail).ing his or her depressive state. 
Lewinsohn (1974) expanded his view of depression by emphasizing the 
importance of the perceived contingent relationship between responding 
and reinforcement. Thus depression is not only a function of a loss of 
reinforcement, but also a function of a loss of control of reinforcement. 
According to the behavioral.theorists then, depression results from 
either a low level of reinforcement or from the loss of reinforcer ef-
fectiveness. Eastman (1976) has criticized the behavioral formulation 
of depression for their lack of specificity and for the lack of basic re-
search supporting these theories. He points out that in talking about a 
low level of reinforcement it is important to consider the parameters of 
reinforcement and to specify these parameters. Specifically, it is un-
clear whether low level of reinforcement refers to frequency, duration, 
magnitude or the amount of behavior required to obtain the reinforcer. 
In addition, he argues that the direction of causation has not been 
clarified regarding the relationship between depression, loss of rein-
forcer effectiveness, and loss of reinforcible behaviors. 
The Cognitive Theories 
The cognitive approaches to depression are primarily concerned 
with the functions of perception, information processing,_ and memory as 
they are related to the depressive syndrome. Beck (196 7) characterized 
the depressive as an individual whose pattern of thought or "schema" 
consists of viewing him-or herself, the world, and the future in a neg-
ative way. Moreover, the depressed person views his or her interactions 
with the environment as unsuccessful and punishing. The self is viewed 
as being inadequate and unworthy, and the fut·ure is viewed as unchanging 
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and a continuation of the present state. Beck referred to this cognitive 
orientation as the "primary triad of depression". This orientation is 
brought about by faulty cognitive processes that affect the individual's 
perceptions. The faulty processes are selected abstraction, arbitrary 
inference, overgeneralization, minimization of positive assets or con-
sequences, and maximization of the negative. These cognitive processes 
operate in the depressed person and enable him or her to create a sub-
jective experience that confirms his or her negative beliefs about the 
self, the world, and the future. For Beck then, depression is primarily 
a thought disorder which produces a distuTbartce in affect and behavior. 
Arieti (1963), like Beck, emphasized the cognitive aspects of depression. 
He proposes that depression is a consequence of the cognitive processes 
of evaluation and appraisal. For· Arie'ti the treatment of depression is 
accomplished by a change at the cognitive level. 
Loeb, Beck, Feshbach, and Wolf (1964) attempted to measure the ef-
fects of depression on perception by having a depressed and a non-de-
pressed psychiatric group rate pictures of faces on a happiness-sadness 
continuum. This rating followed a prearranged success or failure in a 
sentence completion task. No difference was found in rating the pie~ 
tures; however, there was a difference between depressed and non-de-
pressed subjects in their expectations of future perfo.rmance. The high 
depressed subjects showed a greater increase in expectations and mood fol-
lowing a success experience. Also, the depressed subjects demonstrated 
a lower level of expectancy and mood following a failure experience. 
Loeb, Beck, Diggory, and Tuthill (1967) and Loeb, Beck, and 
Diggory (1971) compared the responses of depressed and non-depressed sub-
jects to success and failure feedback on a card-sorting task. Following 
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success the depressed subjects probability of success estimates decreased 
while those of the non-depressed subjects increased. Following failure, 
the probability of success estimates decreased significantly for both 
the groups. In addition, the response time for the depressed group de-
teriorated less in the success condition t~an did the response time of 
the non-depressed group. Despite the depressed subjects' equivalent per-
formance on the task they rated their performance as significantly poorer 
than the non-depressed group. 
Friedman (1964) found that severely depressed subjects scored sig-
nificantly lower on only 4% of 33 cognitive, perceptual, and psychomotor 
tests. However, Friedman found that the depressed subjects rated them-
selves more negatively on 82% of the items of the Clyde Mood Scale. 
Friedman (1964) also noted that depressives significantly underestimated 
their performance on a finger tapping test in comparison to a-non-de-
pressed· control group. These results indicate that depressives' actual 
performance is not consistent with their low self-image. 
Rosenzweig (1960) found that following a success or failure ex-
perience depressed subjects changed their self-ratings more than monnals 
on the Osgood Semantic Differential Scale. The author concluded that de-
pressed subjects exaggerate the ev:aluative aspects of the environment. 
Hammen and Glass (1975) assigned depressed subjects to one of four 
groups. In one group subjects were asked to increase the number of 
pleasant events they engaged in each day over a two-week period. The 
other three groups were given assignments over the two-week period and 
served as control groups. During and at the end of two weeks the four 
groups' levels of depression were measured. It was found that the level 
of depression of the increased-activities group was not affected by the 
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increase in pleasurable activities. Furthermore, it was found that sub-
jects engaged in more of the reinforcing activities rated the events 
less positively than subjects in the other groups. These findings demon-
strate the inadequacy of using only an environmental approach to explain 
depression and suggest the importance of mediational factors. 
Hannnen and Krantz (1975) gave depressed and non-depressed women 
bogus feedback on a task that was said to measure therapeutic potential. 
They found that following failure feedback depressed subjects' level of 
expectancy of future performance decreased significantly more than the 
non-depressed subjects' level of expectancy. Also they found that the 
depressed failure-feedback women evaluated themselves more negatively on 
characteristics for which bogus feedback had been given and for items not 
mentioned in the feedback process. In this s.ame experiment the subjects 
were given an assessment instrument designed to measure the cognitive 
distortions mentioned by Beck (1967). They found that depressed women 
selected significantly more responses characterized as depressive-dis-
torted. 
In an experiment designed to examine the self-blaming tendencies 
found in depression, Rizley (1978) compared the causal attributions of 
depressed and non-depressed subjects after success or failure on a num-
ber~guessing task. It was found that the depressed subjects rated in-
ternal factors (ability and effort) as being more responsible for fail-
ure, but not for success, than did the non-depressed subjects. Rizley 
also compared depressed and non-depressed subjects' attributions in an 
interpersonal situation in which depressed subjects gave advice to a 
partner in a social perceptiveness task. The partner's performance 
either deteriorated or improved on the task without the subjects knowing 
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to what extent the partner had followed their advice. It was found that 
the depressed subjects rated themselves as having more interpersonal in-
fluence over the partner than did non-depressed subjects in both improv-
. ing and deteriorating conditions. These results were interpreted as 
demonstrating the self-blaming tendency and the egocentric notion of 
causality associated with depression. 
In addition to the research involving the interpretation of expe-
rience, another area of cognitive functioning that has been investigated 
is the recall of experience. .The relevance of memory functioning in de-
pression becomes apparent when one considers that the recall of the past 
. not only affects the expectations regarding the future, but also the per-
ception of the present environment (Heider, 1957). 
Lishman (1972) measured the recall of material evaluated as pleas-
ant and unpleasant in psychiatric inpatients. He found that after a two-
week period the depressed subjects' "tendency to recall pleasant material 
over unpleasartt material was less marked" than it was in non-depressed 
subjects. 
Sternberg and Jarvik (1976) used three measures of memory to com-
pare depressed inpatients and control inpatients on short-and long-term 
memory functioning. They found an impairment in short-term memory asso-
ciated with depression on a word associates test, a recognition.:..of-fig-
ures test, and personal-data test. They also found that the greater im-
provement of the depressive state the greater the improvement in short-
term memory. This impairment was not found in long-term memory. In con-
trast, Henry, Weingartner, and Murphy (1971) noted that dep'l:'essives ex-
hibited a significant impairment in long-term memory, but not short-
term memory. They explained this impairment as a problem in transfer-
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ring material from short-term to long-term memory. 
Guza (1977) compared depressed and non-depressed college students' 
ability to recall positive, negative, and neutral audiotaped social in-
teractions. He found that, overall, depressed subjects recalled signifi~ 
cantly fewer interactions than non-depressed subjects. 
Wener and Rehm (1976) examined subjects' ability to estimate prior 
feedback on a "pseudosocial intelligence task". Subjects were adminis-
tered a word association task and given either 80% or 20% positive feed-
back. It was found that the more depressed subjects tended to underesti-
mate the percentage of correct feedback they had received. 
Mischel, Ebbesen, and Zeiss (1976) examined the effects of success 
and failure experiences and expectancies on the selective memory for 
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positive versus negative personality information about the self. They 
found that when subjects expected to succeed they remembered less liabil-
ity information then when they expected to fail. This ~ifference in re-
cal~ing negative self-relevant information was explained as a result of 
selective attention to negative information produced by the negative ex-
pectancies. 
The renewed interest in cognitive processes and the subsequent re-
· search has produced accumulating evidence supporting a differential in-
terpretation of experience in depression. There is also some evidence 
supporting a deficit in recall and a distortion in recall associated 
with depression. 
The Learned Helplessness Model 
"Learned helplessness" is a term first introduced by Seligman to 
describe a condition produced in animals that is analogous to reactive 
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depression. Seligman and Maier (1967) and Seligman and Overtneir (1967) 
initially produced this condition in dogs by subjecting the dogs to a 
series of inescapable shocks. Later the dogs were again placed in the 
experimental situation; however, this time they were given the opportunT 
ity to escape the shock by jumping over a barrier. The dogs that had ex-
perienced the series of inescapable shocks had greater difficulty in 
learning to escape the shock than did a group of naive dogs. In addition 
to the retarded rate of learning, there appeared symptoms similar to 
those found in depression such as weight loss, loss of libido, and nore-
pinepherine depletion. Seligman called this condition "learned helpless-
ness" and explained it as a result of the experience with uncontrollable 
trauma. Through this experience the dogs learned that responding and 
reinforcement are independent. Simila~ results have been obtained in 
experiments using fish, cats, rats, and humans (Behrend & Bitterman, 
1963; Seward & Humphrey, 1967; Thornton & Jacobs, 1971; Weiss, Krieckhaus 
& Conte, 1968). 
Maier (1970) demonstrated that learned helplessness was the learn-
ing of a cognitive set and not the result of learning a motor response 
(passivity reinforced by shock termination). He accomplished this by 
having one group of dogs learn to terminate shock by not responding and 
a yoked group experience the same shock, but independent of responding. 
Thus, one group learned to control the shock by passivity while the 
other group supposedly learned that the shock was uncontrollable. The 
two groups were then tested in a situation requiring them to jump over 
a barrier to escape shock. The dogs that had learned to control the 
shock passively learned to escape more readily than the yoked dogs that 
had experienced the uncontrollable shock. Thus, it was not the learning 
of passive motor responses that interfered with escape, but rather it 
was the learning that responding is independent of escape. 
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Miller and Seligman (1973) tested the learned helplessness model 
with human subjects by measuring the expectancies of success for de~ 
pressed and non-depressed subjects following reinforcement in chance and 
skill tasks. It was found that in the skill task; the expectancy change 
of depressed subjects was less than the expectancy change of non-de-
pressed subjects following success. In the chance task both groups were 
affected the same by the experience. These results were interpreted 
as indicating that the depressed group experienced the reinforcement in 
both situations as being non-contingent on their performance. More 
specifically, for the depressed group the probability of reinforcement 
was perceived as being independent from the response. This response 
independence or learned helplessness has also. been produced in human 
subjects experimentally. 
Kleiri and Seligman (1976) pretreated a group of non-depressed sub-
jects with inescapable noise. This group was then tested along with a 
depressed/no noise group and a non-depressed/no noise group for their 
ability to escape noise in a shuttle box. The depressed/no noise and 
the non-depressed/noise groups both demonstrated deficits in learning to 
escape, .in comparison to the non-depressed/no noise group. These defi-
cits were later eliminated by exposing the subjects to a series of solv-
able discrimination problems. Klein and Seligman (1976) reported a 
second' experiment in which the expectancy change of depressed subjects 
was compared with that of non-depressed subjects who were pretreated 
with either escapable noise, or inescapable noise, or who received no 
pretreatment. They found that depressed subjects and non-depressed/ 
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inescapable noise subjects demonstrated less expectancy change than the 
non-depressed/no noise subjects in a skill task. ' The similarity in per-
formance of the depressed subjects and the non-depressed inescapable 
noise subjects was interpreted as indicating the perception of non-
contingency as a prime factor in depression. 
To find out whether learned helplessness was characteristic only 
of depression, Miller, Seligman, and Kurlander (1975) compared the ex-
pectancy change of depressed, non-depressed, and anxious subjects follow-
ing success and failure on a line-discrimination task. They found that 
the depressed group had a smaller expectancy change after success than 
the.non-depressed and anxious groups. No group differences were found 
in expectancy change after failure or in total expectancy change. The 
i 
non-depressed group and the anxious group did not differ on any of the 
expectancy measures. 
As a further test of the specificity of learned helplessness to 
depression, Abramson, Garber, Edwards, and Seligman (1978) compared the 
expectancy changes of unipolar depressives, depressed schizophrenics, 
non-depressed schizophrenics and non-depressed non-schizophrenics on a 
chance and skill task. The unipolar depressives demonstrated signifi-
cantly less expectancy decrease following failure on the skill task in 
comparison to the other three groups. The unipolar depressives also 
demonstrated less expectancy change following success than the other 
three groups, but not at a significant level. No differences were found 
in expectancy change among the depressed schizophrenics, the non-de-
pressed schizophrenics, and the non-depressed non-schizophrenic groups. 
These findings suggest that perceiving outcomes as response independent 
may be specific to depression. 
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Klein, Fencil-Morse, and Seligman (1976) treated groups of depressed 
and non-depressed subjects with solvable or insolvable discrimination 
problems followed by a series of anagrams. They found that prior expe-
rience with insolvable problems produced a deficit in anagr~ performance 
in both non-depressed and depressed subjects. In addition, they found 
that by telling subjects that their failures on the insolvable discrim-
ination problem was normal and that only a very small percentage could 
succeed, the deficits depressed subjects typically demonstrated were 
eliminated. Thus, when failure could be attributed to external sources 
(task difficulty) depressed subjects performed in a way similar to non-
depressed subjects. 
Recently the learned helplessness model has been revised and has 
i 
incorporated the concepts of attribution theory (.Apramson, Seligman, & 
I 
Teasdale, 1978). The reformulated model proposes that after people per-
ceive a non-contingent relationship between their behavior and outcomes, 
they attribute their helplessness to a cause. The cause of the helpless-
ness may be attributed to internal or external factors, stable or un-
stable factors, and global or specific factors. Depending on the attri-
bution chosen, the individual will experience the helplessness as broad 
or narrow and chronic or acute. The attribution will also determine 
whether there is a loss of self-esteem associated with the helplessness. 
In summary, the original learned helplessness model postulated that 
depression is caused by learning that responding is independent of out-
comes. The depressed person is an individual who learns that he or she 
does not have control over his or her world. This approach may help to 
explain the high incidence of depression not only in individuals who ex-
perience uncontrolled trauma, but also in those who experienc~ uncontrol-
19 
lable positive reinforcement (i.e., beautiful women who are reinforced 
because of their looks and not because of their endeavors). 
The refonnulated model is consistent with the original learned 
helplessness model in that perceived non-contingency is the etiological 
factor in depression. Additionally, however, the new model emphasizes 
the attributional process which detennines the characteristics of the 
· helplessness. 
The learned helplessness model has been criticized on the grounds 
that many of the findings supporting the model can be easily explained 
as a result of motivational deficits. The observed deficits may be pro-
duced by a loss o:f reinforcer effectiveness instead of a perceived non-
contingency (Costello, 1978). 
Additionally, the research supporting the learned helplessness 
I 
model has been criticized for the use of expectancy change as a measure 
of perceived control. The use of this measure originated from Phares 
(1957) and James and Rotter (1958) who found that subjects change their 
expectancy ratings more in skill tasks than in chance tasks. This dif-
ference in expectancy change was interpreted as a function of the sub-
ject's perceived locus of control. 
Recently, however, Frieze and Weiner (1971), Weiner, Cook, 
Heckhausen, and Meyer (1972), and Weiner, Neirenberg, and Goldstein 
(1974) have demonstrated that expectancy change is not a function of in-
ternal-external control as much as it is a function of the stable-unsta-
ble dimension of causal factors. Thus, typical expectancy changes occur 
when subjects explain outcomes by the stable causal factors of ability 
(internal-stable) and task difficulty (external-stable); and do not 
necessarily occur when subjects explain outcomes by the internal factors 
20 
of ability (internal-stable) and effort (internal-unstable). Moreover, 
subjects change their expectancies as a function of chronic or variable 
aspects of the situation and not as a function of their perceived con-
trol. If the findings of Frieze and Weiner (1971) and Weiner et al. 
(1972, 1974) are accurate, the possible confounding of the internal-
external dimension with the stable~unstable dimension in the learned 
helplessness experiments makes the interpretation of their outcomes· 
doubtful (Buchwald, Cole, and Coyne, 1978). 
Statement of the Problem 
The present study was designed to investiage further the relation-
ship between depression and its accompanying cognitive disturbances. 
More specifically, this study examines the expectations, attributions, 
and recall of success and failure outcomes on an anagrams task by de-
pressed and non-depresse4 subjects. 
At the present time no single study has adequately examined both 
the causal attribution and the expectations of depressed subjects in 
regards to success and failure. In many experiments measure of expect-
ancy and performance on achievement tasks have been the only measure of 
how depression affects the interpretation of outcomes. It seems likely 
that more information about cognition and depression can be obtained by 
using both expectancy measures and attributional measures. 
Expectancies and Depression 
As indicated in the review of the literature, Abramson et al. 
(1978), Klein and Seligman (1976), and Miller et al. (1973, 1975) have 
demonstrated that the depressed subject's level of expectancy following 
21 
success artd failure in skill tasks changes less than the level of expect-
ancy of non-depressed subjects following success and failure in skill 
tasks. This difference in expectancy change has been interpreted as be-
ing the result of the depressed person's perceived lack of control over 
the environment. Thus, following success and failure the depressed per-
son's ~xp.ectancy for future success is not affected since the outcomes 
are perceived as chance occurrences or.as non-contingent on responding. 
This contingency acco-rding to the learned helplessness model exists for · 
both positive and negative outcomes. 
In contrast to the learned helplessness model, Beck's mode1 of de-
pression suggests that depressed people hold themselves responsible for 
failure outcomes but not responsible for successes. This differential 
responding has been indicated to some extent in previous studies where 
depressed subjects' level of expectancy has changed less than non-de-
pressed subjects only after.success but not after failure (Loeb et al., 
1967, 1971; Miller et al., 1973, 1975). The differential change in ex-
pectancy following success and failure suggests that the depressed person 
may perceive him-or herself as controlling negative outcomes but not posi-
tive outcomes •. If expectancy change is a measure of response-outcome 
dependency, then according to the learned helplessness model the depressed 
subjects should have less expectancy change than non-depressed subjects 
following both success and failure. In contrast, Beck's model of de-
pression would predict an interaction between expectancy change and suc-
cess and, failure such that depressed subjects in compa~ison to non-de-
pressed subjects would demonstrate less expectancy change only following 
success, and more expectancy change following failure. 
Beck's model of depression also emphasizes a lowered level of ex~ 
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pectancy brought about by a generalized negative perception of the self, 
the world, and the future. Based on this model and the findings of Loeb 
et al. (1964, 1967), it was hypothesized that the depressed group, in 
comparison to the non-depressed group, would have a lower level of ex-
pectancy both before and during the task. Also based on this model it 
was hypothesized that the depressed group, in comparison to the non-
depressed group, would predict a lower level of performance on a future 
anagrams task. 
Attribution and Depression 
Recently Abramson and Sackeim (1977) reviewed the "paradoxical 
cognitions of uncontrollability and self-blame" found in depression. 
They point out that the traditional clinical description of depression 
, I 
involves both helplessness and self-blame. 'I'hey also point out that for 
individuals to have these two attitudes concurrently is illogical. De-
pressed people would be blaming themselves for negative outcomes when 
they do not perceive themselves as controlling these negative outcomes. 
A possible solution to this paradox may be that depressed people per-
ceive themselves as controlling negative outcomes but not positive out-
comes. One purpose of the present study was to address this paradox us-
ing attribution measures to clarify how depressed people differ from 
non-depressed people in interpreting success and failure outcomes. 
Weiner and Kukla (1970) have borrowed from the concepts of Heider 
(1958) and suggested the use of four attribution measures which can be 
aligned on the dimensions of internal-external and stable-unstable. 
The internal-external dimension identifies causal factors as being with-
in the person or within the environment. They propose that this dimen-
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sion is largely responsible for an individual's affective response to an 
outcome. The stable-unstable dimension identifies the causal factors as 
being chronic or variable. This dimension determines whe~her expectancy 
change will occur as the result of an outcome. Combining these dimen-
sions they have produced the factors of ability (internal and stable) , 
effort (internal and unstable), task difficulty (external and stable), 
and luck (external and unstable). These four factors have been used in 
research on attribution behavior and seem appropriate for research exam-
ining causal ascriptions in depression (Rizley, 1978). Thus in addition 
to using expectancy measures, the internal-external attributions were 
also used to measure the perception of responsibility for success and 
failure. Also the stable-unstable attribution was used to examine the 
I 
relationship between the perceived stability of an outcome and expect-
ancy change . 
In general, attribution studies have indicated a trend for subjects 
to explain their success by the internal factors of ability and effort 
and to view the external factors of luck and task difficulty as being 
responsible for their failures (Luginbuhl, Crowe & Kahan, 1975; Streufert 
& Streufert, 1969; Wolosin, Sherman & Till, 1973; Wortman, Costanzo & 
Witt, 1973). This trend, however, has been shown to be reversed for low 
self-esteem subjects (Fitch, 1970; Marecek & Mettee, 1971; Silverman, 
1964), and more recently for depressed subjects (Rizley, 1978). 
Consistent with findings of the attribution research on low self- · 
esteem and depression it was expected that following success the de-
pressed group, in comparison to the non-depressed group, would make at-
tributions more to external factors and less to internal factors. Thus, 
the depressed group should tend to externalize success in comparison to 
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the non-depressed group. Also, since previous research indicates that 
subjects in general tend to externalize failure it was expected that 
this would occur in the present study. Finally, it was predicted that 
the depressed group, in comparison to the non-depressed. group, would 
make attributions more to internal factors, and less to external factors 
following failure. Thus, the depressed group, in comparison to the non-
depressed group, would tend to internalize failure. No predictions 
were made regarding differences involving the factors of ability, effort, 
luck, task difficulty, and stability 
Recall and Depression 
As indicated previously another purpose of this study was to exam-
ine the memory deficits associated with depression,. Both the phenomena 
of reduced recall and distorted recall in depression were investigated 
by having subjects recall the anagrams and the performance feedback that 
was given for each anagram. Consistent with the findings of Guza (1977), 
Henry et al. (1971), and Sternberg et al. (1976) it was hypothesized 
that depressed subjects in comparison to non-depressed subjects would 
recall fewer anagrams. 
Also based on the findings of Lishman (1972), Mischel et al. 
(1976), Wener et al. (1976) it was hypothesized that the depressed sub-
jects' recall of performance feedback on the anagrams would be distorted 





The subjects were 20 male and 20 female undergraduates enrolled at 
Oklahoma State University. They participated in the experiment in re-
turn for extra points in an introductory psychology class. They were 
selected from a total sample of 186 male and 234 female students who 
were administered the Beck Depression Inventory. The original screening 
resulted in the total mean Beck Depression Inventdry scores of 6.30 and 
5.35 for males and females, respectively. Ten male subjects and 10 fe-
male subjects with scores of six or less were assigned to the non-
depressed group. Ten male subjects and 10 female sub]ects with scores 
of 12 or more were assigned to the depressed group. The mean Beck De-
pression Inventory scores of the subjects for the initial testing and 
the retesting are presented in Table 1. Nine students were eliminated 
from the experiment and replaced; six because of decreases in scores 
when retested with the Beck Depression Inventory sufficient to change 
group assignment, and three because of difficulty in following the ex-
perimental procedure. 
Beck Depression Inventory 
The Beck Depression Inventory (see Appendix A) is a multiple-choice 
questionnaire consisting of 21 categories. These categories are derived 
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from the symptoms and attitudes related to depression. There are four 
or five possible choices under each category which reflect the range of 
severity of the symptom. Numerical values of zero to three are assigned 
to each statement to indicate the degree of severity. The total score 
is arrived at by adding these values. 
Group 
TABLE I 
MEAN SUBJECT BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY SCORES FOR 
INITIAL TESTING AND RETESTING 
(N = IO) Initial Score Retest Score 
Depressed 
Males 14.3 13.1 
Females 19.5 17.6 
Non-Depressed 
Males 3.0 2.0 
Females 2.4 1.5 
Beck (196 7) and Metcalfe and Goldman (1965) report correlations 
ranging from .61 to .73 between scores on the depression inventory and 
clinical ratings for level of depression. According to Beck (1967) cor-
relations with other measures of depression are as follows: Hamilton 
Rating Scales, using a Spearman Rank correlation coefficient, .75; De-
pression Adjective Check List, .E = .40 to .66; the MMPI D scale, .E = .75. 
Original norms were developed from a sample of 966 patients classified 
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under various nosological categories. 
Guza (1977) administered the depression inventory to 200 male and 
200 female undergraduates at Oklahoma State University. The males had a 
mean score of 6.9 with a standard deviation of 4.6. The females had a 
mean score of 7.1 with a standard deviation of 5.6. 
Procedure 
The Beck Depression Inventory was administered to classes of under-
graduates following the procedures outlined by Beck (1967). The inven-
tories were then collected and scored. Those subjects with scores of 6 
or less and those with scores of 12 or more were contacted by telephone 
and asked if they wished to participate in the experiment for extra cred-
1 
it in their introductory psychology class. A brief description of the 
experimental task was given and times were arranged. 
All subjects participated in the experiment within three days after 
being given the Beck Depres$ion Inventory. Upon arrival at the experi-
ment, subjects were seated in a room off from the experimental room and 
were again given the inventory. Six students were eliminated from the 
experiment since their retest scores had changed from the depressed 
level to the non-depressed level. Those subjects with appropriate re-
test scores were taken into the experimental room, seated, and then read 
instructions (see Appendix B) adapted from Feather and Saville (1967). 
Subjects were then presented with the following series of 13 six-
letter anagrams adapted from Feather (1969); AFILYM, RIDAYF, OCRSEU, 
MLOCNU, ONRPAD, ONESAD, THFREA, GERIDG, AVERLB, LENGUO, GERIDB, ERROPP, 
OMERND. The first three anagrams were identified as practice anagrams 
and used to familiarize the subjects with the task. They were not fol-
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lowed by feedback. The subjects were then presented with a series of ten 
more anagrams. Each anagram was individually presented by means of a 
projector and slide. To insure that all subjects would be able to solve 
the anagrams. a black dot was placed over the letter that was to be used 
as the first letter of the word and a green dot over the letter to be 
used as the last letter of the word. Prior to each of the 10 test ana-
grams the subject rated the probability of solving the anagram faster 
than 50% of the college population on an 11-point scale, with 0 being 
associated with being completely certain of a slower solution time than 
50% of the college population, and 10 being associated with being com-
pletely certain of a faster solution time than 50% of the college popu-
lation. Subjects were allowed the necessary time to solve each of the 
anagrams. The experimenter timed the subjects with a hand-held stop 
watch. 
Subjects received feedback that indicated half of the trials as 
being faster than 50% or more of the college population (success) and 
half of the trials as being slower than 50% or more of the college popu-
lation (failure). The sequence of feedback for the trials was randomly 
presented along with the order of the anagrams. 
Feedback was given by means of two lights on a panel placed inuned-
iately in front of the subject. The lights were controlled by the ex-
perimenter and labeled with the following: "Failure - your solution 
time· is s•linwer than 50% or more of the population"; "Success - your sol-
ution time is faster than 50% or more of the population". After the 
feedback the subjects were asked to attribute their performance in per-
centages totaling 100% to the four factors of effort, ability, luck, and 
task difficulty. 
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After solving the 10 anagrams the subjects were asked to recall 
the words that were used in the anagrams task. Subjects were given a 
maximtun of 10 minutes. The subjects were then given a list of the 10 
words used as anagrams and asked to recall the feedback given on each of 
the words. The subjects were then asked to predict how many anagrams 
they could solve faster than 50% of the college population on a series 
of 10 more anagrams. All subjects were then questioned about the exper-
iment to ascertain the effectiveness of the feedback and were then thor-
oughly debriefed. 
Dependent Measures 
The dependent variable used to measure expectancy change was that 
i 
used in previous research, (Miller & Seligman, 1973) the total value of 
appropriate expectancy shifts minus the value of inappropriate expect-
ancy shifts following feedback. This consisted of the total amount of 
increase following success minus the total amount of decrease; and fol-
lowing failure the total amount of decrease in expectancy minus the in-
crease in expectancy. This variable was analyzed by a Depression x Sex 
x Feedback factorial analysis of variance with repeated measures of ex-
pectancy change over feedback conditions. 
Three dependent variables were used to measure expectancy level; 
1) the initial expectancy which was the expectancy rating following the 
three practice anagrams prior to the first test anagram and before ari.y 
feedback, 2) the average level of expectancy which was the average of 
the expectancy ratings across the ten trials followed by feedback, and 
3) the predicted success he or she would achieve on a series of 10 more 
anagrams. 
30 
Causal attributions were measured after each anagram on four scales 
in percentages totaling 100%, with no restriction as to the proportion 
of causality attributed to any one source. Following success feedback 
subjects attributed outcomes in percentages totaling 100% to ability, 
effort, good luck, and ease of task. Following failure feedback subjects 
made attribution to lack of ability, lack of effort, bad luck, and dif-
ficulty of task. These repeated and dependent measures of attribution 
following success and failure constituted four of the dependent variables 
in this study. Another variable called Int-Ext was the sum of the at-
tributions made to internal factors (effort and ability) minus the suni 
of the attributions made to external factors (luck and task difficulty). 
A positive value indicates more internal attribution and a negative 
I 
value indicates more external attribution. The final dependent measure 
related to attribution was that of Stable-Unstable. This variable was 
the sum of the stable attributions (ability- and task difficulty) minus 
the sum of the unstable attributions (effort and luck). A positive 
value indicates an attribution to stable factors and a negative value 
indicates an attribution to unstable factors. These six dependent var-
iables were analyzed by 2 x 2 x 2 analyses of variance, with 2 levels of 
depression, 2 levels of sex, and 2 levels of feedback. 
One of the dependent variables used for investigating the effect 
of depression on recall was the number of anagrams correctly recalled. 
The other variable was the number of successes the subjects recalled. 
The first recall variable was analyzed by a 2 x 2 x 2 analysis of vari-
ance with depression, sex, and level of feedback as the factors. The 
distortion variable was analyzed by a 2 x 2 analysis of variance with 
depression and sex as the factors. 
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Experimental Questions and Hypotheses 
1. Tests of the learned helplessness model and Beck's model of 
depression were made by comparing the amount of expectancy change of the 
depressed and non-depressed groups following success and failure. The 
learned helplessness model predicts less expectancy change for the de-
pressed group following both success and failure (i.e., this model pre-
dicts a significant group effect). In contrast, Beck's model suggests 
that the depressed group should have less expectancy change following 
success and more expectancy change following failure than the non-de-
pressed group (i.e., this model predicts a significant group x treatment 
interaction). The validity of these two models was tested by comparing 
the accuracy of their predictions regarding expect1ancy change. 
2. It was hypothesized that the findings of' Loeb et al. (1964, 
1967, 1971) would be replicated: the depressed subjects would have a 
lower level of initial expectancy, lower average expectancy, and a iower 
level of predicted performance. 
3. (a) Consistent with the findings of Fitch (1970), Merecek and 
Mettee (1971), Rizley (1978), and Silverman (1964), it was hypothesized 
that following success the non-depressed group would make more attri-
bution to internal sources than the depressed group. Thus, following 
success the value of Int-Ext would be greater for the non-depressed 
group in comparison to the depressed group. Also, following failure the 
depressed group would make more attributions to internal sources than 
the non-depressed group. Thus, following failure the value of the Int-
Ext would be greater for the depressed group than the non-depressed 
group. (b) Based on the findings of Luginbuhl, Crowe, and Kahan (1975); 
Wolosin, Sherman, and Till (1973); and Wortman, Costanzo, and Witt 
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(1973) it was predicted that following failure both groups would make 
attributions to external sources more than to internal sources. In other 
words, the value of Int-Ext following failure would be less than the 
value of Int-Ext following success. (c) Finally, no predictions were 
made regarding the factors of ability, effort, luck, task difficulty, 
and stable-unstable. 
4. In recalling the anagrams it was hypothesized that (a) the de-
pressed group would recall fewer anagrams than the non-depressed group 
(Guza, 1977; Henry et al., 197i; Sternberg et al., 1976), and (b) the 
depressed group would distort the recall of success feedback in a nega-
tive direction relative to the non-depressed group. Thus, the depressed 
group would recall fewer instances of success. 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Actual Performance Times 
To determine whether there were any significant performance dif-
ferences between the depressed and non-depressed groups, two analyses 
were conducted. The first analysis employed a 2 x 2 randomized design 
to compare the depressed and non-depressed groups' total solution times 
for the first three.practice anagrams prior to an~ feedback. The re-
sults of the analysis of variance used to make this comparison of mean 
total solution times is presented in Table II. No significant main ef-
fects or interaction effects were found. 
The second analysis of performance time for the depressed and non-
depressed groups involved a comparison of the mean total solution times 
for the ten anagrams that were followed by feedback. The results of 
this analysis are presented in Table III. Again no signficant differ-
ences were found between the performance of the two groups. 
Expectancy Ratings 
The means for the measure of expectancy change following success 
and failure feedback are presented in Table IV. An analysis of vari-
ance comparing the amount of expectancy change following success and 
failure for the depressed and non-depressed groups did not indicate any 




ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE EFFECTS OF DEPRESSION 
AND SEX 01'l THE TOTAL SOLUTION TIMES OF 3 
PRACTICE ANAGRAMS PRIOR TO FEEDBACK 
2 x 2 
SS df MS 
A (Depression) 3515.625 1 3515 .625 
B (Sex) 16 77 .025 1 16 77 .025 
AB 207.025 1 207.025 






ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE EFFECTS OF DEPRESSION AND 
SEX ON THE TOTAL SOLUTION TIMES OF 10 ANAGRAMS 
FOLLOWED BY FEEDBACK 
2 x 2 
Source SS df MS F -
A (Depression) 16081. 1 1 16081. 1 0.41 
B (Sex) 23716. 9 1 32716.9 0.61 
AB 4579.6 1 4579.6 0.12 
Within Subjects 1406801.0 36 39077. 8 
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learned helplessness model, that the depressed group would have smaller 
levels of expectancy change following success and failure was not sub-
stantiated. Also, this analysis did not indicate a significant interac-
tion. Thus, the hypothesis based on Beck's model that the depressed 
group, in comparison to the non-depressed group, would have less expect-
ancy change following success and more expectancy change following fail-
ure was also not supported. The results of the analysis of variance 
used to investigate these hypotheses are presented in Table V. 
TABLE IV 
MEAN RATINGS OF EXPECTANCY AS A FUNCTION OF 





Success Failure Success Failure 
Expectancy change 1.95 1.65 2.25 1.85 
Table VI contains the means of the initial expectancies, the means 
of the average expectancy across trials, and the means of the number of 
predicted successes. The results of the analysis of variance conducted 
on the level of initiai expe.ctancy . (expectancy following the three prac-
tice anagrams prior to any feedback) are presented in Table VII. This 
analysis was conducted to investigate the hypothesis stenuning from 
• 
Beck's model which predicts a lower level of expectancy for depressed 
subjeets. This analysis did not indicate a significant main effect for 
Source 
TABLE V 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE EFFECTS OF DEPRESSION, 
SEX AND SUCCESS AND FAILURE FEEDBACK 
ON EXPECTANCY CHANGE 
2 x 2 x 2 
SS df MS 
A (Depression) 1.25 1 1.25 
C (Sex) 2.45 1 2.45 
AC 0.45 1 0.45 
Subjects w. Group Error 356.40 36 9.9 
B (Feedback) 2.45 1 2.45 
AB 0.05 1 0.05 
BC 1.25 1 1.25 
ABC 0.45 1 0.45 
BX Subjects w. Group Error 34.80 36 0.97 
TABLE VI 
MEAN RATINGS OF EXPECTANCY AS A FUNCTION OF 













Measure Male Female Male Female 
Initial expectancy 
Expecta~cy across trials 














ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE EFFECTS OF DEPRESSION 
AND SEX ON INITIAL EXPECTANCIES 
2 x 2 
Source SS df MS 
A (Depression) 3.025 1 3.025 
B (Sex) 21.025 1 21.025 
AB 0.225 1 0.225 
Within Subjects 74.70 36 2.08 





depression; however, it did indicate a significant main effect for sex 
such that the male subjects in comparison to the female subjects had a 
I 
higher level of initial expectancy, F (1, 36) = 10. 13, .E. < • 003. A 
planned !,-test used to further compare the depressed and non-depressed 
group's initial expectancy was not statistically significant; however, 
there was a tendency for the depressed group to have a lower level of 
initial expectancy (M = 4.7) in comparison to the non-depressed group 
(M = 5.26), !_(36) = 1.21, .E. < .12. 
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An analysis of variance was conducted on the average level of ex...-
pectancy across the ten trials to further test the hypothesis of a lower 
level of expecta~cy associated with depression. The results of this 
analysis are presented in Table VIII. Consistent with the predictions 
based on Beck's model, the depressed subjects in comparison to non-de-
pressed subjects demonstrated a significantly iower average expectancy 
across trials F(l, 36) = 4,. 21, .E. < • 05. This analysis also indiaated a 
highly significant main effect for sex such that the male subjects, in 
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comparison to the female subjects, had higher average expectancy ratings 
F(l,36) = 17.18, .E. < .001. 
TABLE VIII 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE EFFECTS OF DEPRESSION 
AND SEX ON AVERAGE EXPECTANCIES 
2 x 2 
Source SS df MS 
A (Depression) 5. 852 1 5. 852 
B (Sex) 23.870 1 23.870 
AB 0.072 1 0.072 
Within Subjects 50.033 36 1.390 
*.E. < .05 





The results of the analysis of variance for the level of predicted 
success on a series of ten more anagrams are presented in Table IX. 
This analysis was employed as an additional test of the hypothesized 
negative conception of the future associated with depression. The anal-
ysis of ·variance did not indicate a significant main effect for depres-
sion. There was however, a significant main effect for sex such that 
the predictions for future performance were higher for males than fe-
males, F(l,36) = 9.5, .E. < .004. A planned t-test used to further compare 
the depressed and non-depressed subjects estimates of future performance 
did not reach statistical significance. However, there was a tendency 
for the non-depressed subjects to make higher estimates of their per-
formance on a future anagrams task, ~(36) = 1.47, .E. < .10. 
TABLE IX 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE EFFECTS OF DEPRESSION 
AND SEX ON THE PREDICTIONS OF SUCCESS 
2 x 2 
Source SS df MS 
A (Depression) 12 .10 1 12 .10 
B (Sex) 52.90 1 52.90 
AB 8.10 1 8.10 
Within Subjects 200.40 36 5.57 








The mean ratings for the causal ascription of ability (or lack of), 
effort (or lack of), luck (good or bad), and task (ease of or difficulty 
of), are presented in Table X. Also in this table are the means of the 
variables used to measure internal attribution and perceived stability. 
Large positive values indicate a greater degree of attribution, a greater 
degree of internality, and a greater degree of perceived stability. 
Univariate analyses of variance consisting of two levels of depres~ 
sion, two levels of sex and two levels of feedback were used to analyze 
each of these variables. The results of these analyses for the attri-
bution ratings to ability, effort, luck and task are presented in 
Appendix C. These analyses did not indicate any statistically signifi-
cant main or interaction effects. 
The results of the analysis of variance performed on the measure 
of causal attribution to internal'factors (Int-Ext) is presented in 
Table XI. This analysis did not indicate any significant main effects; 
TABLE X 
MEAN ATTRIBUTIONS OF DEPRESSED AND NON-DEPRESSED 




Group Ability Effort Luck Task Int-Ext Stable-Unstable 
Depressed 
Success 31.55 32 .15 12. 80 23.75 27.63 10.50 
Failure 36.55 23.00 16. 80 22.65 21. 25 20.40 
Non-Depressed 
Success 35. 75 35.75 24. 85 16.20 21.20 17.20 
Failure 28.20 25.30 20.40 25.90 10.00 7.45 
Note: Higher values indicate greater causal attributions. 
TABLE XI 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE EFFECTS OF DEPRESSION, SEX AND 
SUCCESS-FAILURE FEEDBACK ON THE ATTRIBUTION RATINGS 
TO INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CAUSAL FACTORS 
2 x 2 x 2 
Source SS. df MS 
A (Depression) 1566. 45 1 1566. 45 
C (Sex) 4992.80 1 4992. 80 
AC 320.00 1 320.00 
Subjects w. Group Error 72169. 70 36 2004. 71 
B (Feedback) 1548. 80 1 1548. 80 
AB 115. 20 1 115. 20 
BC 3781.25 1 3781. 25 
ABC 551. 25 1 551.25 










however, the sex x treatment interaction was marginally significant indi-
cating that female subjects tended to internalize failure more than males 
f(l,36) = 3.52, .E. < .07. Since specific predictions had been made re-
garding the variable Int-Ext, !_-tests were performed comparing the de-
pressed and non-depressed groups Int-Ext causal attributions for success 
and failure. In the success conditions the groups did not differ signi-
ficantly. ·rrt the failure conditions there was only a tendency for the 
depressed group to make ratings in a more internal direction than the 
non-depressed group !. ( 36) = 1. 04, .E. < • 16. Thus, the hypothesis that the 
depressed group, in comparison to the non-depressed group, would tend to 
externalize success and internalize failure was not substantiated. 
The Int-Ext measure was also used to test the hypothesis that sub-
jects overall would give higher ratin&s to internal factors in the suc-
cess condition than in the failure condition. A planned !_-test was used 
to compare the mean ratings of the Int-Ext causal attributions following 
success (M = 24.4) and failure (M = 15.6). The results of this test 
were not statistically significant; however, the means were in the pre-
dicted direction, !_(36) = 1.21, .E. < .15. 
The results of the analysis of variance for the ratings on the 
stability dimension are presented in Table XII. This analysis did not 
indicate any sigrtificant main effects, or interaction effects. 
Recall Measures 
It was hypothesized that the depressed groups would recall fewer 
anagrams than the non-depressed group. The results of the analysis of 
variance on the number of anagrams recalled did not support this hypoth-
esis. These results are presented in Table XIII. This analysis did 
Source 
TABLE XII 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE EFFECTS OF DEPRESSION, 
SEX AND SUCCESS-FAILURE FEEDBACK ON THE 
ATTRIBUTION RATINGS FOR STABILITY 
2 x 2 x 2 
SS df MS 
A (Depression) 195. 31 1 i95. 31 
C (Sex) 1178.11 1 1178.11 
AC 9 .11 1 9 .11 
Subjects w. Groups Error 32479.95 36 902.22 
B (Feedback) 0.11 1 0.11 
AB 1930.61 1 1930. 61 
BC i89 .11 1 · 189 .11 
ABC 1304.11 1 1304 .11 











ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE EFFECTS OF DEPRESSION, SEX 
AND SUCCESS-FAILURE FEEDBACK ON THE RECALL OF 
SOLVED ANAGRAMS 
. 2X2X2 
Source SS df MS F 
A (Depression) 1.01 1 1.01 1.08 
C (Sex) 0.31 1 0.31 0.33 
AC 0.01 1 0.01 0.01 
Subjects w. Group Elt.tor 33.65 36 0.94 
B (Feedback) 7.81 1 7.81 7.67* 
AB 1.51 1 1.51 1.49 
BC 1.51 1 1.51 1.49 
ABC 1.01 1 1.01 0.99 
B X Subjects w. Group Error 36.65 36 1.01 
*.E. < .01 
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indicate a significant main effect for feedback such that there was a 
significantly greater number of failure feedback anagrams recalled in com-
parison to success feedback anagrams .f(l,36) = 7.67, .E. < .009. A planned 
t-test was instituted to examine further the number of recalled anagrams 
of the depressed and non-depressed subjects. This analysis was also not 
significant. In fact, the mean number of anagrams recalled by the de-
pressed subjects (M = 4. 75), was slightly higher, although not signifi-
cantly higher, than the number recalled by the non-depressed subjects 
(M = 4.30). Thus, the recall deficit supposedly associated with depres-
sion was clearly not demonstrated. 
The results of the analysis of variance for the recall of success 
performance feedback is presented in Table XIV. This analysis did not 
indicate any significant main or interaction effects. A planned !_-test 
was also conducted to test further the hypothesis of distorted recall of 
feedback associated with depression. A comparison of the mean number of 
successes recalled by the depressed and non-depressed was not signifi-
cant, with means of 5405 and 5.25, respectively. Thus, the hypothesis 
that the depressed groups, when recalling the feedback, would report 
less success feedback then the non-depressed group was not substantiated. 
TABLE XIV 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE EFFECTS OF DEPRESSION AND 
SEX ON THE RECALL OF SUCCESS FEEDBAcK 
2 x 2 
Source SS df MS 
A (Depression) 0.40 1 0.40 
B (Sex) 2.50 1 2.50 
AB 0.43 1 0.43 








The hypothesis from the original learned helplessness model of de-
pression that depEessed subjects in comparison to non-depressed subjects 
would demonstrate less expectancy change, was not supported in this ex-
periment. According to the learned helplessness model the smaller 
amount of expectancy change shown by depressed subjects in previous 
studies (Abramson et al., 1978; Klein & Seligman, 1976; Miller & Seligman, 
I 
1973, 1976; Miller et al., 1975) is the result of ~he depressed subjects' 
belief in a non-contingent relationship between their responses and out-
comes. 
A somewhat different hypothesis regarding expectancy change was 
derived from Beck's model of depression. This hypothesis stated that if 
expectancy change is a measure of perceived control then there should be 
an interaction between depression and outcomes, such that the depressed 
subjects, in comparison to non-depressed subjects, would show less ex-
pectancy change following success and more expectancy change following 
failure. This pattern would be produced by the depressive's tendency to 
consider him/herself as not responsible for success but responsible for 
failure. This hypothesized interaction did not occur in this experiment. 
Instead, both the depressed and non-depressed groups demonstrated ap-
proximately the same increments in expectancy follrn.iing success and the 




It is unlikely that both models are entirely inaccurate. It may 
be that the lack of group differences in expectancy change in the present 
study was due to the subject's perceiving the task as being one of 
chance rather than skill. If this were the case both groups would be 
expected to have similar levels of expectancy change. It is unlikely, 
however, that this occurred since subjects were told in the instructions 
that the task related to verbal and problem-solving ability. In addi~ 
tion, if the subjects perceived the task as one of chance one would ex-
pect the attributions to luck to be considerably higher than they were. 
A more likely explanation for the lack of differences between the two 
groups on the measure of expectancy change is that expectancy change is 
not an appropriate measure of perceived control (Costello, 1978; Rizley, 
1978; Weiner et al., 1971, 1975). It may be that, as Weiner has sug-
gested, expectancy change is not a function of the internal-external 
causal dimension as much as it is a function of the stable-unstable 
causal dimension. If this is the case it may help explain why several 
recent studies in addition to the present one have been unable to find 
significant differences in expectancy change as a function of depression 
(Hollon, 1977; McNitt ·& Thornton, 1978; O'Leary, Donovan, Krueger, 
Cysewski, 1978; Roth & Bootzin, 1974; Sacco & Hokanson, 1978; Smolen, 
1978; Willis & Blaney, 1978). 
Another hypothesis related to Beck's model ef depression was that 
depressed subjects would have lower levels of expectancy than non-de-
pressed subjects. The measures of initial e~pectancy, average expectancy, 
and predicted performance were used to test this hypothesis. The aver-
age level of expectancy following success and failure clearly different-
iated the two groups, giving support to the hypothesis. The measures of 
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initial expectancy and predicted performance approached significant 
levels, lending further support to the hypothesis. In general then, the 
hypothesis that pessimism is associated with depression was supported. 
This lower level of expectancy occurred even though both groups received 
the same level of success feedback. In addition, there were no differ-
ences between the groups in time needed to solve the anagrams; thus, the 
lower expectancy of the depressed group was not based on any actual per-
formance deficit. This is consistent with the earlier findings of Loeb 
et al. (196 7, 1971). Beck (1976) explains the depressive' s negative ex-
pectations as a result of a process of "screening out" positive experi-
ences. An alternative explanation may be that the lowering of expecta-
tions is an adaptive function, serving to prevent further disappointment 
and loss. It has been suggested that depression-prone individuals have 
unrealistic standards and goals, and that depression sometimes results 
from not meeting these expectations (Bandura, 1969; Beck, 1976, Cysewski, 
1975; Schwarz, 1974). It may be that after failing to meet these un-
realistic expectations the depressed person reacts by lowering his or 
her expectations, thereby avoiding further disappointment and further 
loss of self-esteem. 
Another finding involving the measures of expectancy was that of a 
difference in expectancy level for males and females. Consistently 
across the three measures--initial expectancy, average expectancy, and 
predicted performance--the female subjects rated their probabilities of 
success and their predicted performance lower than male subjects. As in 
the case of the depressed subjects this lower level of expectancy for fe-
male subjects was not based on any actual performance deficit. This 
difference in expectancy between sexes is consistant with the findings 
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of previous research (Crandall, 1969; Deaux, White & Farris, 1975; 
Feather, 1969). These findings may indicate that females view themselves 
as generally less competent on tasks of skill. These findings might 
also be the result of the socialization process in our culture which has 
traditionally encouraged passivity and modesty in females. In a setting 
where expectations are expressed publicly as in this experiment, females 
· may tend to express less confidence as a function of what is socially 
acceptable. In more private setting this difference may not occur. Ob-
viously, statements about the accuracy of either explanation in account-
ing for the observed sex differences depend on further research. 
The measures of causal attribution to the factors of ability, ef-
fort, luck and task were not significantly different for the depressed 
and non-depressed groups. 
I 
In the study by Rizley i(1978) there was a 
sigrtificant interaction between depression and outcomes on the measure 
of ability such that depressed subjects, in comparison to non-depressed 
subjects, rated ability as a less important causal factor for success, 
but not for failure. Although in the present experiment this interac-
tion did not occur at a statistically significant level, the means were 
in a direction consistent with the earlier study. 
The attribution measure, internal-external was formed by subtract-
ing the sum of the two external causal sources (luck and task) from the 
two internal causal sources (ability and effort). This measure was used 
as an indication of the extent to which the subjects perceived themselves 
in control of and responsible for the outcomes of success and failure 
(Weiner et al., 1971). Beck's model of depression predicts a differen~ 
tial attribution on the va:d Elble internal-external for success and fail-
ure, such that depressed people, in comparison to non-depressed people, 
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would tend to externalize success and internalize failure. Although the 
means were in the predicted directions following failure, they were not 
significantly different; overall this prediction was not supported by 
the findings of this experiment. In contrast, the experiment by Rizley 
(19 78) demonstrated that depressed subjects, in comparison to non-de-
pressed subjects, rated internal causal factors as more important deter-
minants of failure but not of success. The inconsistent results of the 
present study with the previous study may be accounted for by the meth-
odological differences in the two experiments. In the study by Rizley 
(1978) the subjects made attribution ratings after completing the entire 
task, which was then judged either a success or a failure. In the pre-
sent study the subjects made repeated ratings throughout the task and 
i 
may have been uncertain about the factors producing outcomes until the 
later trials. In retrospect it would have been interesting to obtain 
an additional attribution rating regarding the subject's overall per-:-
formance at the end of the ten trials. 
The characteristics of the subject population used in the two ex-
periments is. another important factor that may have produced the incon-
sistent results on the internal-external variable. It may be that de-
pressed individuals with chronic low self-esteem are self-blaming. How-
ever, not all depre$sed people have low self-esteem, nor are all indivi-
duals with low self-esteem depressed (Zung, 1972). It may be possible 
to have mildly depressed subjects with normal levels of self-esteem who 
are not self-blaming. In turn it may be that in a non-depressed group 
there are subjects with low self-esteem who are self-blaming. The lack 
of a high correlation between self-esteem and depression may reduce 
group differences in attribution processes. It is interesting that in 
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the study by Fitch (1970) subjects characterized as having low self-
esteem, as measured by the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale (Fitts, 1964), 
demonstrated an attributional process similar to the depressed subjects 
in the study by Rizley (1978). Both the low self-esteem group and the 
depressed group attributed significantly more causality to internal 
sources following failure than did the comparison groups, a high self-
esteem group and a non-depressed group, respectively. It seems unlikely 
that the subjects in the Fitch study were also depressed since the se-
lection process was based on a median split of subjects' scores, and it 
is unlikely that in any random sample half of the subjects would be de-
pressed. It may be then, that self-esteem and not depression is the 
variable that affects the extent to which a person internalizes failure 
outcomes. 
The variability of this self-blaming tendency in depression has 
recently been hypothesized by Abramson et al. (1978). He points out that 
people may experience helplessness as being universal or personal. In 
either situation the person is depressed; however, in the case of uni-
versal helplessness the individual is not self-blaming and does riot suf-
fer from a loss of self-esteem. In contrast, in the situation of per-
sonal helplessness the individual is self-blaming and experiences a loss 
of self-esteem. In future studies dealing with attributional processes 
and depression, it is essential that a clear distinction be made regard-
ing these possible subtypes of helplessness. 
Another hypothesis related to the internal-external variable was 
that subjects in general would tend to internalize success more than 
failure. Although this hypothesis was not supported at a significant 
level, the means were in the predicted direction. In part this hypothe-
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sis was not substantiated because of the differences in the attributions 
of male and female subjects. Interestingly, the male subjects demon-
strated a tendency to internalize success and externalize failure, while 
females internalized both success and failure. Thus, the male subjects 
in this experiment demonstrated the self-serving bias which supposedly 
serves to protect self-esteem (Miller & Ross, 1975). 
The difference between the male and female subjects' internaliza-
tion of failure is especially interesting considering that women are 
from 2 to 10 times more likely than men to experience a depression 
(Radloff, 1975). It is possible that this difference in the frequency 
of depression for the sexes may be due to the differences in their at-
tributional patterns. Weiner et al. (1971) suggest that an individual's 
affective response to an outcome is generally determined by the locus of 
i 
control. If this is so, women in general may be more negatively affect-
ed by failure then men, since they may see themselves as the cause of 
their failures more often then men. Whether this pattern of attribution 
is task dependent or a more general phenomenon would be an important 
area of future research. 
On the measure of stability, which was the sum of the unstable 
factors, effort and luck, subtracted from the sum of the stable factors, 
ability and task difficulty, no significant differences were found be-
tween the depressed and non-depressed groups. Frieze and Weiner (1971) 
and Weiner et al. (1972, 1974) have demonstrated that attributions to 
the causal sources involving the stable-unstable dimension are more im-
portant in getermining expectancy shifts than are attributions to the 
causal sources involving the dimension of control. If this is so, one 
would have expected group differences on this measure if there had been 
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group differences on the measure of expectancy change. No significant 
group differences were found on this variable. 
Previous research has demonstrated a relationship between memory 
deficits and depression (Guza, 1977; Henry et al., 1971; Lishman, 1972; 
Sternberg & Jarvick, 1976). Inconsistent with these findings, the pre-
sent study found no difference between the depressed and non-depressed 
subjects recall of the anagrams. A relatively low number of anagrams 
was recalled by both groups (less than half). ·It seems likely that in-
terference produced by the experimental tasks of solving the anagrams, 
and rating attributions and then expectancies, after exposure to the 
anagrams may account for the low number of anagrams recalled. 
Payne and Hewlett (1960) suggested that many of the deficits found 
i 
in depression are produced because depressed people are distracted by 
their depressive thoughts and worries. This may explain why in previous 
studies depressed individuals have demonstrated memory deficits. They 
simply may not attend to the material or rehearse it to the extent that 
non-depressed individuals do. In order to solve anagrams in the present 
study a moderate level of attention and concentration was required. 
Since both groups performed at approximately the same level in solving 
the anagrams, it can be assumed that both groups were attending at ap~ 
proximately the same level. If attention is the important variable then 
no dificit should have resulted. Additionally:, the tasks of rating at-
tributions adding to 100% and rating expectancies may have· served to 
distract the depressed subjects from their depressive thoughts. At the 
same time the experimental task may have interfered with the non-de-
pressed subjects' rehearsal of the anagrams. Future research could ade-
quately test whether memory deficits in depression are a function of 
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attention by varying the content of the material, the manner of presen-
tation, and the conditions under which the material is presented, i.e_., 
with or without interference. 
An unexpected finding was that subjects overall recalled more fail-
ure anagrams than success anagrams. This finding is inconsistent with 
that of Lishman (1972) who found that material with pleasurable connota-
tions was recalled better than material with negative connotations. The 
better recall of failures in the present experiment may be the result of 
more attention being directed to the failure anagrams because of concern, 
puzzlement, and/or anxiety. 
The final hypothesis, based on the findings of Wener and Rehm 
(1976), was that the depressed group would recall receiving less success 
' feedback than the non-depressed group. This hypothesis was not substan-
tiated by the results of this experiment. The dir'ference in outcomes of 
the Wener and Rehm (1976) study and the present study may be explained 
by the methodological differences in the studies. In the former study 
depressed subjects "estimated" their level of success- feedback. In the 
present study subjects were given the list of anagrams and asked to "re-
call" the feedback they had received on each anagram. It may well be 
that when depressed subjects report general impressions of past outcomes, 
they may negatively distort these outcomes. However, when they actually 
recall these outcomes by associating them with specific instances, this 
distortion does not occur. The absence of distortion when specific in-
stances are presented may have implications for the treatment of depres-
sion. It may be beneficial for the depressed person to focus on specific 
instances in the past rather then dealing with the past in an impression-
istic manner. This focusing may help to bring about a change in the 
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depressed individualts perception of the past and possibly a change in 
his or her expectations for the future. 
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CHOOSE ONE STATEMENT UNDER EACH LETTER THAT BEST DESCRIBES YOU FOR THE 
LAST SEVEN DAYS. CIRCLE THE NUMBER TO THE LEFT OF THE STATEMENT YOU 
HAVE CHOSEN. 
A. 0 I do not feel sad. 
1 I feel sad. 
2 I am sad all the time and I can't snap out of it. 
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it. 
B. 0 I am not particularly discouraged about 'the future. 
1 I feel discouraged about the future. 
2 I feel I have nothing to look forward to. 
3 I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve. 
C. 0 I do not feel like a failure. 
1 I feel I have failed more than the average person. 
2 As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot of failure. 
3 I feel I am a complete failure as a person. 
D. 0 I get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to. 
1 I don't enjoy things the way I used to. 
2 I don't get real satisfaction out of anything anymore. 
3 I am dissatisfied or bored with everything. 1 
E. 0 I don't feel particularly guilty. 
1 I feel guilty a good part of the time. 
2 I feel quite guilty most of the time. 
3 I feel guilty all of the time. 
F. 0 I don't feel I am being punished. 
1 I feel I may be punished. 
2 I expect to be punished. 
3 I feel I am being punished. 
G. 0 I don't feel disappointed in myself. 
1 I am disappointed in myself. 
2 I am disgusted with myself. 
3 I hate myself. 
H. 0 I don't feel I am any worse than anybody else. 
1 I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes. 
2 I do blame myself all the time for my faults. 
3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens. 
I. 0 I don't have any thoughts of killing myself. 
1 I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out. 
2 I would like to kill myself. 
3 I would kill myself if I had the chance. 
J. 0 I don't cry anymore than usual. 
1 I cry more now than I used to. 
2 I cry all the time now. 
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~ I used to be able to cry, but now I can't cry even though I want 
to. 
K. 0 I am no more irritated now than I ever am. 
1 I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used to 
2 I feel irritated all the time now. 
3 I don't get irritated at all by the things that used to irritate 
me. 
L. 0 I have not lost interest in other people. 
1 I am less interested :in other people than I used to be. 
2 I have lost more of my interest in other people. 
3 I have 1ost all of my interest in other people. 
M. 0 I make decisions about as well as I ever could. 
1 I put off making decisions more than I used to. 
2 I have greater difficulty in making decisions than before. 
3 I can't make decisions at all anymore. 
N. 0 I don't feel I look any worse than I used to. 
1 I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive. 
2 I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that 
make me look unattractive. 
3 I believe that I look ugly. 
O. 0 I can work about as well as before. 
1 It takes an extra effort to get started at doing something. 
2 I have to push myself very hard to do anything. 
3 I can't do any work at all. 
P. 0 I can sleep as well as usual. 
Q. 
R. 
1 I don't sleep as well as I used to. 
2 I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and f:iJnd•it hard to get 
back to sleep. 
3 I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get 
back to sleep. 
0 I don't get more tired than usual. 
1 I get tired more easily than I used to. 
2 I get tired from doing almost anything. 
3 I am too tired to do anything. 
0 My appetite is no worse than usual. 
1 My appetite is not as good as it used to be. 
2 My appetite is much worse now. 





0 I haven't lost much weight, if. any, lately. 
1 I have lost more than 5 pounds. 
2 I have lost more than 10 pounds. 
2 I have lost more than 15 pounds. 
I am purposely trying to lose weight by eating less: Yes No 
0 I am no more worried about my health than usual. 
1 I am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains; or 
upset stomach, or constipation. 
2 I am worried about physical problems and it's hard to think of 
much else. 
3 I am so worried about my physical problems, that I cannot think 
about anything eise. 
0 I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex. 
1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
2 I am much less interested in sex now. 





In this experiment I am interested in finding out how well you can 
predict and monitor your performance on a task that is related to verbal 
ability and problem solving ability. You will be shown a series of 
slides of anagrams. Anagrams are letters of the alphabet that are dis-
arranged that can be rearranged to make a word. Your task will be to re-
arrange each group of letters projected on the wall in front of you, so 
that they make a meaningful English word. For example, the letters 
t-c-a can be arranged c-a-t to form the word cat. The anagrams you will 
be working with will contain six letters that can be arranged to form a 
connnon English word. On each of the anagrams there is a black dot under 
the letter which is to be used as the first letter of the word, and a 
green dot under the letter which is to be used as the last letter of the 
word. Please try to do your best and work as quickly as you can in solv-
ing each anagram as your solution time will be taken as a fairly accurate 
indication of your verbal and problem solving ability in comparison to 
the college population. You will be given as much time as necessary to 
solve each anagram and you are to continue to work until you reach the 
solution. The anagrams are of varying difficulty, thus some will take 
you longer than others. After you have solved the anagram say the word 
and I w-ill stop timing. You will then be given feedback based on·how 
fast you have solved the anagram, in comparison to the rest of the col-
lege population. You will receive the feedback by means of the lights 
in front of you. Each light is labeled and will come on for three sec-
onds to let you know how well you have done. The red light indicates 
that your response time was slower than 50% or more of the college popu-
lation, and the green light indicates that your response time was faster 
than 50% or more of the college population. After the light goes off I 
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want you to explain your perfonnance by indicating to what extent you 
think the factors of ability, effort, luck and task difficulty affected 
your perfonnance. I want you to indicate this by circling the approp-
riate percentage points on the four scales on the sheets next to the red 
or green light. If your performance was faster than 50% or more of the 
college population use the sheets with the heading "success" next to the 
green light. If your performance was slower than 50% or more of the col-
lege population use the sheets with the heading "failure" next to the 
red light. In explaining your performance mark the four scales so that 
the total percentage of the four scales equals 100%. You may use any 
proportion of the four scales to explain your performance, but make sure 
the total from the four scales equals 100%. Keep in mind that your re-
sponse time for each anagram is compared to the average response time of 
the college population for that particular anagram. Also it is reason-
able to assume that variability in your performance may be produced by 
the factors of ability, effort, luck, or task difficulty. Finally, be-
fore each slide is shown I want you to estimate how certain you are that 
you can solve the next anagram in a time that is faster than 50% or more 
of the college population. You are to estimate your degree of certainty 
of success by marking the scales in the booklet in front of you. You 
may use any number on the scale from 0 to 10. If you feel completely 
certain that your solution time will be faster than 50% or more of the 
population, you may rate yourself with a high number such as a 9 or a 10. 
If you feel moderately sure that your time will be faster or slower than 
50% of the population, you may rate your degree of certainty with a num-
ber nearer the center of the scale. If you feel completely certain that 
your time will be slower than 50% of the population, rate your degree of 
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certainty with a lo'Wer number, such as 0. It is important that you 
select your estimates carefully and that they correspond closely with 
how certain you really are. They should be an accurate description of 
the degree to which you really feel tha.t you will or will not be able to 
solve the anagram faster than 50% of the college population. 
Before we begin with the actual testing you will be given 3 practice 
anagrams without receiving any feedback or filling out any of the fortns. 
After you have solved the third practice anagram mark in the booklet how 
well you expect to do on the first test anagram. If you have any ques-
tions at any time please feel free to ask. 
APPENDIX C 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLES FOR THE ATTRIBUTION 
RATINGS TO THE CAUSAL FACTORS OF ABILITY, 
EFFORT, LUCK, AND TASK DIFFICULTY 
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TABLE XV 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE EFFECTS OF DEPRESSION, 
SEX AND SUCCESS-FAILURE FEEDBACK ON ATTRIBUTION 
RATINGS TO AB!LITY 
2 x 2 x 2 
Source SS df MS 
A (Depression) 132.61 1 132. 61 
C )Sex) 82.01 1 82.01 
AC 56.11 1 56.11 
Subjects w. Group Error 8868. 2.5 36 246.34 
B (Feedback) 12 .01 1 12.01 
AB 918.01 1 918.01 
BC 148.51 1 148.51 
ABC 214.51 1 214.51 
BX Subject w. Group Error 11859. 45 36 329.43 
TABLE XVI 
.ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE EFFECTS OF DEPRESSION, SEX 
AND SUCCESS-FAILURE FEEDBACK ON THE ATTRIBUTION 
RATINGS TO EFFORT 
2 x 2 x 2 
Source SS df MS 
A (Depression) 125.00 1 125.00 
C (Sex) 500.00 1 500.00 
AC 22.05 1 22.05 
Subjects w. Group Error 7059.50 36 196 .10 
B (Feedback) 378.45 1 378.45 
AB 460.80 1 460.80 
BC 245.00 1 245.00 
ABC 530.45 1 530.45 



















ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE EFFECTS OF DEPRESSION, SEX 
AND SUCCESS-FAILURE FEEDBACK ON THE ATTRIBUITON 
RATINGS TO LUCK 
2 x 2 x 2 
Source SS df MS 
A (Depression) 245.00 1 245.00 
C (Sex) 45.00 1 45.00 
AC 24.20 1 24.20 
Subjects w. Group Error 10326 .60 36 286. 85 
B (Feedback) 336.20 1 336.20 
AB 0.20 1 0.20 
BC 88.20 1 88.20 
ABC 24.20 1 24.20 
B X Subjects w. Group Error 3558. 20 . 36 98.83 
TABLE XVIII 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE EFFECTS OF DEPRESSION, SEX 
AND SUCCESS-FAILURE FEEDBACK ON THE ATTRIBUTION 
RATINGS TO TASK 
2 x 2 x 2 
Source SS df MS 
A (Depression) 33.80 1 33.80 
C (Sex) 638.45 1 638.45 
AC 42.05 1 42.05 
Subjects w. Group Error 7403.90 36 206.66 
B (Feedback) 14.45 1 14.45 
AB 76.05 1 76.05 
BC 387.20 1 387.20 
ABC 7.20 1 7.20 



















EXPECTANCY RATING SCALE 
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Expectancy Ra.ting Scale 
Indicate how certain you are that your solution time will be faster or 
slower than at least 50% of the population by circling the appropriate 















If your perf onnance was faster than 50% or more of the population 
circle a percentage point on each of the scales to indicate to what 
extent you think your perfonnance was detennined by ability, effort, 
good luck, or ease of task. 




I I I I I I I I I I I 








I I I I I I I I I I I I 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Ease of Task 
Not Completely 
Responsible Responsible 
I I I I I I I I I I 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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FAILURE 
If your performance was slower than 50% or more of the population 
circle a percentage point on each of the scales to indicate to what 
extent you think your performance was determined by lack of ability, 
lack of effort, bad luck, and task difficulty. 
THE TOTAL OF THE FOUR SCALES MUST EQUAL 100%. 
Not 
Responsible 















Lack of Ability 
30% 40% 50% 60% 
Lack of Effort 
30% 40% 50% 60% 
Bad Luck 
I I I I 
30% 40% 50% 60% 
Difficulty of Task 
I . I I I I 



















I I I 
90% 100% 
APPENDIX F 
FEEDBACK RECALL AND PREDICTED PERFORMANCE FORM 
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Recall your perf onnance feedback for each of the following test anagrams 
you solved and indicate that feedback by writing it next to the appropri-
ate anagram. 
PRACTICE ANAGRAMS 
Course No Feedback 
Friday No Feedback 
Family No Feedback 
s Success 
F = Failure 











Indicate the number of successes you prodict you will have on a series 
of 10 more anagrams by writing the number in the space below. 
PREDICTED SUCCESSES ON 10 MORE ANAGRAMS ----
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